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FIVE TYPES OF JUDICIAL DECISION
By ANTHONY R. BLACKSHIELD*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this article is to offer as a tool for the study of judicial
decision-making a typology substantially devised by the late Howard Becker
(1899-1960) as a sociological tool for the study of "sacred" and "secular"
value-systems and societies. To produce the version here to be used, Becker's
concepts have had to be systematized, reconstructed, punched and pummelled,
partly truncated and partly expanded.r Nevertheless, the scheme here offered
remains distinctively his. The application of it to the study of law might be
justified in several ways.
A.

Law and Religion

First, one might dwell on those features of law which most closely resemble the "sacred", in the popular sense of that term. It is true that the
esoteric traditions of the legal profession have, in recent centuries, had more
to do with the medieval craft guild than with the priestly cultivation of religious mysteries; but the resulting posture of lawyers - one of careful cultivation of a special body of knowledge, and a jealous guarding of that knowledge
from unseemly lay intrusions - often wears a decidedly hierocratic air. lus
dicitur ars boni et aequi, cuius merito quis2nos sacerdotes appellat: iustitiam
namque colimus et sacra jura ministramus.
An air of sanctity and mystery, too, is carefully preserved in the courtroom - not merely in the solemn ceremonial use of robes and rituals3 (though
those on the bench are often quite as elaborate as any before the altar), but
in the inward and spiritual attitudes of which these are but the outward and
visible sign. Sir Owen Dixon, while Chief Justice of the High Court of
Australia, is reported to have told a journalist (in a rare interview) that "a
certain mystery should surround the judiciary in its higher reaches. ' 4 That
attitude may seem old-fashioned. But when the turmoil of the sixties erupted
into the courtroom, not only in attempts to disrupt the courts but in attempts
to use them, even the more enlightened judicial responses invoked notions of
* Associate Professor of Law, University of New South Wales (on leave); Visiting
Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, January-June 1974.
I See infra, text accompanying notes 21-30. For his own final version, here mainly
relied on, see H. Becker, "Current Sacred-Secular Theory and its Development", in
H. Becker & A. Boskoff ed., Modern Sociological Theory in Continuity and Change
(New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1957) at 133 [hereinafter Becker (1957)].
2 Dig. 1.ii.; see Bracton, f. 2b, 3.
3 For Becker the use of ceremonials is the most obvious and most pervasive hallmark of every variety of "sacredness". See Becker (1957), at 149-52; and see infra,
text accompanying note 28.

41 have been unable while in Canada to verify this quotation. A reference to the

Melbourne Age for 1959 would be half-memory, half-guess.
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institutional sanctity and dignity, of contempt of court and abuse of process,
which went far beyond any functional needs either of doctrinal tradition, or
of institutional role.5 And although, in less dramatic respects, many lawyers
and judges have sought to "modernize" laws and courtroom procedures - to
render them more functional, more accessible, and above all more human such efforts are still best understood as pitting a secularizing trend against an
ongoing sacred tradition.
In many other ways, too, the growth of the world's great legal systems
has been closely analogous to that of the great religious systems. Historically,
the main role of all such systems has been as agencies of social control:" as
complex sets of institutional and doctrinal devices for the elaboration and
transmission of norms of conduct, and for backing these norms with the
compelling force of "authority" - both through the assertion of institutional
power to give rulings which must be accepted, and through the purported
demonstration that particular norms are justified as grounded in higher values.
This functional preoccupation with social control, whether the relevant norms
are "justified" or (as it were) "mustified", has led servitors of law and religion alike to deep entanglements (on the whole unhappy ones) with tasks of
moral guidance and exhortation, and often also with tasks of (largely ritual)
disapproval, and (far from ritual) punishment, of conduct perceived as
immoral. At best, these moralizing tasks evoke rather simple and homespun
manifestations of kindliness; at worst, they evoke a formidable authoritarianism. The line between the fatherly and the paternalistic is often a fine one;
and, either way, such moralistic adventures are distractions (albeit inescapable ones) from the single-minded pursuit of the loftier truths and ideals to
which men, in espousing law or religion, had thought they were dedicating
themselves. The result, in both law and religion, is much uneasy juggling and
awkward compromise between a range of moral activities in a sense irrelevant,
but at least (for good or ill) having some direct functional social impact, and
a range of dedications to some inner kind of reality whose importance may
not be measurable in functional impact at all.
Finally, even in these inner dedications, law and religion are deeply
divisive as amongst those who serve them. Perhaps any earnest commitment
which is also an intellectual quest must lead in the end to conflict between
the commitment and the questing. However-that be, it is certainly clear that
5 Undoubtedly the most tangled and dramatic case was the trial before Judge
Julius Hoffman of the "Chicago Seven". See now In re Trials of Pending & Future
Criminal Cases, 306 F. Supp. 333 (N.D. 111. 1969); U.S. v. Seale, 461 F. 2d 345
(7th Cir. 1972); In re Dellinger, 461 F. 2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972). Other modem loci
classici are (in Britain) Morris v. Crown Office, [1970] 2 Q.B. 114 (CA.); (in Canada)
A.G. Quebec v. Charbonneau (1974), 13 C.C.C. (2d) 226 (Que. C.A.); (in Australia)
Ex p. Tuckerman; Re Nash, [1970] 3 N.S.W.R. 23 (C.A.). And see Theodore Becker
ed., Political Trials (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971); N. Hakman, "Political Trials
in the Legal Order: A Political Scientist's Perspective" (1972), 21 .. Pub.L. 73.
0 For a preliminary attempt at a model for analysis here, with special reference
to law, religion, and education, see A. L Blackshield, "Secularism and Social Control
in the West: The Material and the Ethereal", in G.S. Sharma ed., Secularism: Its
Implications for Law and Life in India (Bombay: N.M. Tripathi, 1966) at 9, esp.
at 14-18.
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the massive intellectual activity which men, through countless ages, have
addressed to religion and law, has in each case involved a constant struggle
between highly sophisticated rationalizations and highly systematic elaborations of complex and abstract conceptual structures whose ultimate appeal
is to reason, and unanalyzable commitments to values (sometimes dogmatic
and obscurantist, but often also most moving and noble) whose ultimate
appeal is to faith. Debates about precedent are as rich in illustrations of this
struggle as are debates about divine revelation - which, indeed, they closely
resemble.
Yet to focus on a religious model, to which we should try to assimilate
law, would be to narrow absurdly the reach of the "sacred" value-systems
which Becker intended to explore. And even if this were not the case, a
presentation built upon the analogy between law and religion - an argument that sacred/secular theory can be applied to legal debates because law
is "like" religion - would, I believe, trivialize the real value of Becker's
concepts for lawyers. I shall, therefore, make no attempt to pursue these
analogies further.
B. Law and Change
At a deeper and more instructive level, we might seize upon the special
and pervasive importance, in legal debates, of an underlying polarity very
closely resembling that which Becker sought to elaborate. His point of departure was an attempt to explicate the contrast between the "sacred", and
the "secular"; 7 and his central insight, which his detailed typology merely
elaborates, is that "sacred" and "secular" are words which we use essentially
as indicia of our attitudes to change. Men's "sacred" values are those as to
which they display, in their feelings, beliefs and behaviour, an extreme resistance to change; a society is "secular" in respect of those values for which
the feelings, beliefs and behaviour of men in that society are compatible with
an easy acceptance of change. Today's highly secular society is also an extremely changeable one; in some areas we have learned to welcome change,
and in most other areas we have at least learned to accept it. This, says
Becker, is what "secular" means. By contrast, a society dominated by "sacred"
values is a static, even timeless one - not in all respects, but precisely to the
extent that its dominant values are "sacred". The antinomy, in human cultures, between "sacred" and "secular" values, is a measure of changing human
attitudes to the idea of change itself.
This same antinomy, never resolved, between readiness and resistance
to change, is, of course, a central feature of our attitudes to law. In particular,
7See Becker (1957) at 141-43. At 142 he says that "the secular is not merely the
reverse of the sacred"; but his discussion in general seems to proceed as if it were. On
the difficulties of his attempt to suggest an alternative meaning of "secular", see Blackshield, supra note 6, at 36n. One obvious difference between "sacred" and "secular",
leading to some clumsiness in exposition, is that "sacred" denotes a quality which we
attribute to an object of value, "secular" a kind of attitude adopted towards such objects. In the traditional Hindu attitude to the cow, it is the cow, not the attitude, that is
"sacred"; in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, "secular" describes attitudes, not cows. I assume,
however, that this is merely a grammatical point.
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it shapes the direction and structure of the endless theoretical debates surrounding the nature and legitimate use of the common law judicial process debates which I hope here to illumine. Whether we think of Judge Cardozo's
profound reflections on "the spirit of change, and the spirit of conservation", 8
or of Lord Wright's poignant question, as he surveyed the growth of the
common law, as to "how this perpetual process of change can be reconciled
with the principle of authority and the rule of stare decisis",9 or of the late
Wolfgang Friedmann's antinomies between "tradition and progress, stability
and change, certainty and flexibility",10 the tension between a vision of law
as in ceaseless Heraclitean flux, and a vision of law as enduring timelessly
down through the ages, is always with us." The polarity is essentially the
same as that between "sacred" and "secular" attitudes to social value-systems,
as Becker understands those terms; and his conceptual strategies for clarifying
and coping with the conflict ought also to be helpful to us.
Essentially, Becker's proffered solution is to take the two concepts,
"sacred" and "secular", and substitute a continuous scale on which, for the
sake of convenience, we can pick out a number of conceptual positions, more
subtly differentiated than the original two. Becker's own versions of this
augmented number of concepts vary from four1 2 to twenty-two;13 in the
version here used (which does not correspond precisely to any of his) there
are five. We begin, therefore, with a model of two rather gross and unexamined conceptual postures, pitted against one another in a crude unsophisticated way, and conducive only to the unhelpful and oversimplified
thinking that goes with a two-valued logic (or an adversary system of law).
We substitute a subtly-shaded spectrum (or "continuum") of degrees, still
open to an infinite number of gradations ranging from extreme resistance to
change to extreme eagerness for it, but clustering these gradations around
(in the present version) five readily distinguishable positions. These five positions are thus arranged "along a line leading from estimated maximum
reluctance to change old values to estimated maximum readiness to seek new
values".

14

8 B. N. Cardozo, The Paradoxes of Legal Science (New York: Columbia University Press, 1928) at 7. Cardozo was here adapting the ideas of A. N. Whitehead, Science
and the Modern World (New York: Macmillan, 1925) at 281.
0
Lord Wright, Legal Essays and Addresses (Cambridge: University Press, 1939)
at xvi.
1o W. Friedmann, Legal Theory (5th ed. London: Stevens & Sons, 1967) at 86-87.
Friedmann there conflates the narrow issue of contrasting concepts of judicial method
with the wider issue, also here relevant, of the broadly ideological use of theories about
law as devices for the support or revolutionary undermining of the political status quo.
As to this see J. Stone, Human Law and Human Justice (London: Stevens & Sons,
1965) at 37, 79.
11
For a fuller discussion of these tensions see J. Stone, Legal System and Lawyers'
Reasonings (London: Stevens & Sons, 1964) at 209-12, 229-34.
12 Proverbial, prescriptive, principial and pronormless societies. See Becker (1957)
at 163, 182-83; and see infra, text accompanying notes 28-30.
'a See H. Becker, Through Values to Social Interpretation (Durham, N.C.: Duke
University Press, 1950) ch.5.
14Becker (1957) at 143.
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Moreover, these focal positions are presented to us as types. We are not
to expect (for example) religious attitudes to abortion to fit neatly into one
or another of five watertight compartments, or exclusive pigeonholes. Rather
we should use all five "types" of attitude towards the idea of change as
analytical tools which help us to study attitudes to abortion. The empirical
attitudes which we study may prove to involve subtle combinations, and
partial overlappings, of two or more different "types". The conceptual array
of five distinct types is nevertheless indispensable as a way of helping us to
perceive what the empirical combinations and overlappings are.' 5
In the context of debates concerning the judicial process, there are two
good reasons why a spectrum of "types" should be of greater usefulness than
a polarization of opposites. First, lawyers' debates about stability and flexibility,
continuity and change, are not a matter of choosing between one set of values
and the other. What is needed is a way of giving effect (and meaning) to
both sets of values. It is not for nothing that one of the classic common law
formulae for symbolizing the timelessness of the English common law, locates
its eternal verities in that most changeable of residences, "the breasts of Her
Majesty's judges"."' In paradox or in mystical vision, we can of course unify
the most deeply divided of opposites; but if the working common law unity
of tradition and change is to be analyzed at a meaningful rather than a
mystical level, we need to move from impressionism to a more sober specification of component parts. A battery of "types", with its resources for picking
out different and apparently inconsistent aspects of the same empirical
phenomenon, is precisely the equipment we need to help us see how common
law judges have managed so successfully to have their cake and eat it too.
Second, apart from the special need to explain the apparent unity of
conservation and change in law, there is in any event a need for a set of
analytical tools more adapted to the complex diversity of legal phenomena
than those which we currently have. The point is not just that polar opposites
are inadequate to a complex discussion, but that even our polar opposites are
almost wholly elusive. We have no clearly accepted terminology, and what we
have is used only in amorphous and undefined ways. Our difficulty is both
that we work with oversimple dichotomies, and that we have not even agreed
upon meaningful labels for the dichotomies which we so hotly debate. One
kind of attitude to the judicial process, for example, is often symbolized by
(usually disparaging) references to "legal realism": but this kind of debating
habit not only does injustice to legal realists, but muddies rather than clarifies
the issues of principle we wish to debate. Another kind of attitude (as resistant to change as "legal realism" is receptive to it) is often characterized,
following Pound,17 as "mechanical jurisprudence"; but this, too, has usually
15 See Becker (1957) at 163 ('The Uses and Abuses of Landmarks"). And for
the definitive statement on the formation and application of "types" see E. A. Shils &
H.A. Finch ed., Max Weber on the Methodology of the Social Sciences (New York:
Free Press of Glencoe, 1949) at 90-93.
16 For a witty exchange on this theme, inter alia as to the reliability of Canadian
breasts as repositories of such an inheritance, see Gray v. Gee (1923), 39 T.L.R. 429,
at 430.
17
R. Pound, "Mechanical Jurisprudence" (1908), 8 Colum.L.Rev. 605.
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generated more heat than light. Instead of working with paired polarities, we
work with unpaired pejoratives. And even when a polarity emerges, its
poles are so confusingly defined as to lead us only into a series of endless
false trails and cross-purposes.
The ongoing debate initiated by Ronald Dworkin's article "The Model
of Rules",' 8 for instance, pits a model of judicial decision-making in terms
of "rules" against one in terms of "discretion". But both "rules" and "discretion" are conceived of in such inadequate (and so deeply self-contradictory) ways, that any hope of coming to grips with the reality of the judicial
process is stultified at the outset. The broad dialectic of Dworkin's argument
by which out of the thesis of "rules" and the antithesis of "discretion" a
synthesis of "principles" is born - does, indeed, parallel in certain crude
structural respects the kind of analysis here to be offered. But I hope to show
that, with greater care in our choice of analytical concepts and their structural
(systematic) inter-relations, a far more flexible and illuminating account can
be achieved.
Moreover, insofar as there are discernible polarities in juristic debates,
these polarities chronically conflate a number of quite disparate matters.
Most importantly, models and strategies of judicial decision-making as actually
espoused and practised by judges are confused, in the literature, with such
models and strategies as perceived or projected by legal theorists. "Conservative" attitudes to judicial precedent and social change as actually held
and implemented by judges are one kind of phenomenon, essentially an
empirical one; such attitudes as held by legal theorists, whether as tools for
analysis of actual judicial behaviour or as evaluative standards for desirable
judicial behaviour, are another thing altogether. And similarly with "liberal"
or "progressive" attitudes.
In order to achieve a rough preliminary identification of the polarities I
here hope to clarify, I propose by stipulative definition to use the terms
"judicial dogmatism" and "judicial pragmatism" to denote contrasting attitudes and practices of judges, and the terms "legalism" and "realism" for
contrasting attitudes of legal theorists. "Dogmatism" and "pragmatism" are
contrasting styles of judgment; "legalism" and "realism" are contrasting views
about judgment. I assume that in each pair of terms the distinguishing feature
is that of resistance or receptiveness to change, just as it is in Becker's contrast of "sacred" and "secular" models.
A second contrast is between factual and evaluative uses of the positions
thus labelled. To say that a judge is "dogmatic" in his close adherence to
precedent and strict application of the law, regardless of considerations of
justice and social utility, is one kind of observation; to say that he accepts
the "dogmatic" model as a desirable one, as a symbol of the ideals to which
he aspires in his judicial behaviour, is a different observation. A fortiori, to
say that a jurist perceives the judicial process, in his descriptive writing about
18 (1967), 35 U.Ch.L.Rev. 14. Much of Dworkln's rhetoric there is directed to
certain straw men dubbed "nominalists". I assume that these are "legal realists" under

another guise.
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that process, in terms of a "legalist" model, is quite different from saying that
he believes, as a matter of prescriptive viewpoint, that the proper performance
of tasks of judgment should reflect that model. No doubt, in the writings of
both "legalists" and "realists" about judgment, their prescriptive models
largely shape their descriptive observations. But a careful drawing of such
distinctions, and a careful observation of how the descriptive and prescriptive
goals of legal theory interact, would greatly enhance our understanding of
most theoretical writing about judicial decision-making.
With these preliminary clarifications, the objectives of the present article
can at last be stated. We begin with a crude polarity (in terms of actual
judicial behaviour) between "dogmatism" and "pragmatism"; and another
polarity (in terms of jurisprudential theory) between "legalism" and
"realism". We shall try, by adapting Becker's typological elaboration of a
sacred/secular scale, to attain a more closely empirical and more flexible
understanding of the realities underlying these crude intuitive contrasts.
C.

Law and Culture
Even then, this parallelism between different kinds of polarity used to
symbolize contrasting attitudes to the prospect of change does not fully explain the potential value of Becker's model for lawyers. It is not that an
analysis developed for the study of one set of (extra-legal) cultural responses
to change can conveniently be "borrowed" as a tool for study of a different
set of (legal) responses which also happen to be focused on the prospect of
change. It is rather that Becker's field of inquiry, properly understood,
embraces legal phenomena, and attitudes to those phenomena, as an important
and integral part. Becker's concern is not with extra-legal evaluative systems
to which we must somehow try to analogize legal phenomena; it is rather
with a broad and all-inclusive range of cultural systems, of which law is one
example.
The point is not merely the obvious one that the law of any community
is an important part of its culture. It is rather that the legal aspects of a
society's culture contain within themselves, in a highly developed and sophisticated form, all the working parts of "a culture"; so that law, for many purposes, can be studied almost in isolation as a distinct subculture, often substantially independent of other parts of the culture, and displaying in microcosm
all the features of "culture" in general. In particular, law as we know it in
any human society is an interaction of three distinct dimensions or variables.
First, "the law" consists of a specific and partially independent "social
system", occupying a high-level role of formulation and maintenance of
explicit behavioural norms, in relation to the whole society of which it forms
a part. "The law" in this sense is a complex set of well-defined institutions courts, legislatures, administrative agencies, and law-applying and law-enforcing organs of all kinds - along with the totality of the human beings
who staff and serve them. In law as in other subcultures, of course, the most
important functional effect of these institutions is to provide a well-defined
and predictable set of interdependent social roles, and clear expectations of
conduct and behaviour in those roles, for the human actors who must perform
as official representatives of the institutions, or ancillary servitors of them.
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In a second sense, "the law" may mean the ongoing process of creation
and application of norms, which flows from (and indeed is) the working of
these institutions. The focus here is on the human activity - including verbalizing, reasoning and choice-making activity - for which institutions provide both a physical setting, and a formal cultural structure. In this sort of
context, for "cultures" in general, Becker speaks of the "essential" human
activity as a rolled-up, undifferentiated one of "knowing-desiring-norming'. 9
From this viewpoint, the fundamental problem in studying any body of culture is to understand how this human commingling of perceptions and evaluations, itself an input into the culture, is influenced or even determined by
other component parts of the culture.
In a third sense, "the law" may mean the specific body of cultural materials of substantially normative content, which are used by the institutions
of "the law" as distinctive instruments of its processes. It is this component
in legal culture to which Roscoe Pound gave the definitive rubric "the
authoritative legal materials"; 20 and, of course, the theoretical conflict between "legalism" and "realism" is largely concerned with how exclusively
this body of received doctrine should be used as the basis for the reasoning
and decision-making activities of judges. Taking judges' "knowing-desiringnorming" as a starting-point for inquiry, we are asking how far that activity
is (or ought to be) controlled by the use of "authoritative legal materials".
It is, of course, fundamental to any attempt of this kind to distinguish
the interacting variables in any body of culture, that each of the variables
thus perceived can meaningfully be taken as a starting-point for inquiry. We
might analyse the workings of law from the viewpoint of a focus either on
legal institutions, or on the human activities (and especially "knowing-desiring-norming") of men in those institutions, or on the authoritative materials
("culture" in the narrow sense) which are taken as the ostensible and bestarticulated basis for "knowing-desiring-norming". But, wherever we start, our
objective should be to enhance understanding of the interaction which is
taking place continually among all these variables. Ultimately, our concern
is with the total workings of a total culture.
This sort of culture-wide concern, and especially a concern to locate
men's devices for "knowing-desiring-norming" in their total cultural context,
is (in relation to cultures in general) the subject of Becker's inquiry. Insofar
as his study is successful, it ought to be directly applicable to judicial "knowing-desiring-norming", not by way of analogy, but by way of a paradigm case.
"Sacred" and "secular", in his usage, are not terms for picking out one sub-set
(or one range of applications) of men's cultural ideas; they are terms for
studying the operation of culture in general. In focusing on "knowing-desiringnorming", he is concerned to stress, first, that sociological inquiry must always
be addressed to fluid and ongoing social processes (which are really human
activities), rather than to reified structural models imposed upon (and giving
an illusory static or "frozen" appearance to) the actual social flux; second,
19
2

Becker (1957) at 140.

0 See 2 R. Pound, Jurisprudence (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1959)

et seq.

at 106
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that the processes and human activities studied are always fundamentally
geared to the implementation of values, in the broadest possible sense; 2' and
third, that the identification and pursuit of values is always dependent upon,
and shaped by, an all-embracing context of culture.22
But this all-embracing reference frame, which makes Becker's work so
receptive to legal applications of it, is also the source of certain confusions and
unnecessary complexities in his analysis. The danger of trying to talk about
"culture" (or even about "values") in an all-embracing sense, is that we
lose any clear conception of what we are talking about. In constructing his
sacred/secular scale, Becker is careful not to commit himself to any assumptions about the unidimensionality or cumulativeness of scales; 23 but the loss
of scientific rigour which this self-abnegation entails may also be a loss of
consistency, and even of clarity. Certainly, the overall structure and drive of
his analysis would have been clearer if he had kept firmly in view some
directly comparable aspect or point of view, in respect of which the different
points on his scale were being linked with each other. As it is, his discussion
seems to pile indiscriminately one upon another several different layers of
analysis.
Thus, the "sacred" end of his scale - that is, the whole range from
extreme resistance to change, to a neutral mid-point at which change is
neither resisted nor sought - is first presented through a parade of what are
really different "types" of sets of behavioural norms: the holy; the loyalistic
("compromising clan allegiance, patriotism, identification with one or another race, class, faction, party"); the intimate ("ties with playfellows, friends,
comrades, mates, partners"); the moralistic; the fitting; and the merely appropriate ("the sacred on the fringe of fadeout") .24 The kinds of norms embraced by these different loyalties are so diverse that it is doubtful whether
they form any kind of unilinear set; and whatever unifying principle may be
present seems not to be extendable into the "secular" reaches of the scale. At
times, in this catalogue of (progressively weaker) "sacred" loyalties, Becker
speaks as if he is comparing "types of evaluation"; at times his concern is
rather with types of orientation to values. 25 At times the criterion for differentiation of points on the scale appears to be the kind and degree of
punishment which one is willing to inflict on others for their infringement of
21

See Becker (1957) at 134: "Swiss cheese, 'pie in the sky', well-being, misery,
concealed pride, a prestigeful Cadillac, an enemy soldier, Satan, glory, and a ten-dollar
debt are all objects of needs of some kind, and in our sense are values."
22
See Becker (1957) at 139-40, 142-43. By way of theoretical background he
invokes G. H. Mead's "symbolic interactionism", as to which see G. H. Mead, Mind,
Self and Society (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1934; A. M. Rose ed., Human
Behaviour and Social Processes (London: Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1962); A. Strauss
ed., The Social Psychology of George H. Mead (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press,
1956).
2
3 See Becker (1957) at 143n.
2
4Id. at 143-49.
25 To some extent the confusion here may be merely grammatical, depending on
whether in particular contexts it is more convenient to talk about valuing attitudes, or
about the objects of such attitudes. See supra note 7. But some degree of substantive
confusion, or comparison of incommensurables, appears to be present as well.
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one's own felt obligations (ranging from death to "nothing more than mild
and courteously concealed amusement . . . no more than an inadvertent

twitch at the comers of the mouth") ;26 at other times the focus is rather on
the kinds and degrees of hardship which one is willing to undergo oneself in
the implementation or defence of such obligations (ranging from martyrdon
to mild inconvenience). This last criterion, identified (perhaps too readily)
with his own initial criterion of degrees of resistance to change, appears
to be Becker's most deliberate choice of a unifying feature for the "sacred"
parts of his scale; but this criterion turns out not to be convincingly usable
for the "secular" parts of the scale.27
Accordingly, in the present adaptation of Becker's analysis, this level
of classification will be wholy jettisoned - not merely because it is not readily
applicable in legal contexts, but because it does not seem theoretically satisfying even in the culture-wide contexts for which it was designed.
At a second level, reduplicating in parallel tracks the ground already
traversed (and therefore still dealing only with the "sacred" part of the scale),
Becker traces the different workings-out, for all the above kinds of loyalty,
of the principle that "sacred" allegiance is always manifested (and significantly reinforced) through adherence to ceremonial and ritual forms of behaviour.2 8 But this, too, proves not to be convincingly transferrable to the
"secular" parts of the scale;2 and this, too, will here be dispensed with.
At a third level, again retracing the "sacred" part of the scale, he
identifies two main varieties of implicit or explicit "symbolizing of sacred
reluctances": the proverbial and the prescriptive. The focus here, as we shall
see more fully in the next section, is quite clearly on the kinds of collocations
of norms which a culture may transmit as explicit techniques for social
control: and at first sight this concentration on types of predetermined
normative system may seem to render this approach, too, incommensurable
with that employed in the "secular" parts of the scale in which the significant
unifying factor is a relative absence of predetermined articulate norms.
Becker, however, retains the labels "proverbial" and "prescriptive" to denote
the first two of four types of society to which, in the end, the whole of his
sacred/secular scale is reduced; and our own adaption of his scale will use
these same labels to denote two of the five types of decision-making on which
that adaptation will focus. The essential unifying feature, which Becker's own
account never precisely spells out, is that, once we focus on different ways
of "knowing-desiring-norming", we are really directing our attention to different strategies which men and their societies may favour for the making of
,value-choices;and appeal to predetermined norms, whether "proverbial" or
"prescriptive", is one kind of strategy for such choices. This normative
strategy, in both its versions, is relatively resistant to change (and hence
displays a "sacred" orientation in. Becker's sense); strategies relatively independent of predetermined norms are also relatively receptive to change (and
26Becker (1957) at 148-49.
id. at 161-62.
i8 Id. at 149-52.
20 See id..at 162-63. "
2 7See
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hence "secular" in his sense). The focus on preferred or dominant strategies
for value choices is not only the focus which we need for a typology of judicial
decisions; it is also the missing focus which alone makes coherent overall
sense of Becker's typology of "cultures".
In the "secular" reaches of Becker's scale, he again proceeds at two
levels. First, focusing now much more directly upon his own basic criterion
of receptiveness to change, he proceeds from bare receptiveness to frenetic
eagerness for change for its own sake; 30 but here again our criterion, of
favoured strategies for value choice, seems an equally appropriate one. From
adherence to principles (seen essentially as receptive to change, yet in many
attitudinal ways as still reflecting the normative orientations of the "sacred"),
he proceeds to two kinds of purposive or teleological evaluation: the "pursuant" (i.e. pursuant to abstract principles) and the "expedient".
His account of "pursuant" evaluation tends to conflate it substantially
with adherence to principles. By contrast, we shall here attempt to purge his
account of principial decision of "pursuant" overtones (leaving "principles"
isolated in a rather pure and contentless form), and shall instead assign
"pursuant" evaluation (along with "expediency") to a single category which
(in part on substantive grounds, and in part for the sake of alliteration!) we
shall here describe as "pragmatic".
Finally, Becker moves to consider types of evaluation which, though
not wholly abandoning norms, appear characteristically to favour or tend
towards normlessness. This tendency to normlessness Becker dubs "pronormlessness"; it completes his scale, and ours.
At a second level, Becker parallels this account of "secular" strategies
for evaluation by identifying two broad "secular" types of society, designed to
balance (as it were) the "proverbial" and the "prescriptive" as types of
"sacred" society. For this purpose he omits the "pursuant" and "expedient"
altogether, presumably assimilating the former to the "principial", the latter
to the "pronormless". Whether we focus (as we shall do here) on types
of decisional strategy or (as he does) on types of society, this wholesale
omission of the entire range of value-orientations here labelled "pragmatic"
appears to be a serious weakness in his final scheme. It is thus on grounds
of substance, as well as of symmetry, that we here substitute a set of five
types for Becker's final four. Even if our concern, like his, was with types of
society or culture, our set of five types would seem more appropriate to
analytical needs. For as soon as the criterion for classifying cultures is seen
to be that of preferred or dominant strategies for value choices, the five typeconcepts now to be offered seem to represent the fullest and most rewarding
application of that criterion. The present five-item scale is offered both as an
adaptation of Becker's sacred/secular scale for lawyers, and as an improved
model of it for sociologists.
Without more ado, I shall now describe in more detail the five positions
on our revised sacred/secular scale.
30 Id. at 155-61.
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II. FIVE GO ADVENTURING AGAIN"'
A.

The Proverbial
In contexts of extreme resistance to change, the characteristic kind of
norm invoked in support of evaluative judgments is the proverb. Such norms
are "chiefly of traditional and nonrational character." They are transmitted
"through communication among intimates rather than through being entrusted
to specialized instructors functioning in formal organizations such as schools";
and the tradition thus imparted is accepted and adhered to "merely because it
is tradition". Proverbs are "compressed bits of verbalized experience", presented to us usually in "jumbled masses" rather than in any codified system.
(They may, however, be "intertwined, grown together, or merged" to acquire
a kind of holistic significance which goes beyond a mere congeries into what
Becker calls "accreteness".) 3 2 The explicit meaning of any "proverb" may
often be relatively trivial, but it is "full of implicit symbolism", mostly of
great normative importance. It is at this implicit level that tendencies to
"accreteness" enter: "the implicitness of at least part of the proverb, concretely considered, is accompanied by the related implicitness of its systematic
linkage with other proverbs." Yet proverbs
are often contradictory in content even when full account is taken of both
explicit and implicit aspects. The users of proverbs glibly repeat first one and
then another, without seeming at all disturbed by what to outsiders are obvious
discrepancies which would be viewed as such by insiders too if they had ever
taken the trouble to codify their proverbs 33

That legal maxims behave in ways that are characteristic of proverbs is

self-evident, both in their traditionalism and in their irrationality.3 4 What may

not be quite so self-evident is that common law rules in general display the
same grounding in an essentially oral tradition, the same chaotic and cheerful
juxtaposition of contradictions, and the same dependence on implicit and
potential depths of meaning for their growth and effectiveness.
Moreover, a "proverbial" culture is also a "pro-verbal" culture, a "folk"
or "preliterate" one which tends to favour oral rather than written communication for the transmission of its learning and lore. The system of precedent was in its early centuries precisely a folklore system; and its transformation, through written reports, from oral lore into written learning, was
vigorously resisted by a whole generation of judges.3 5 Techniques of legal
education, well into the twentieth century, have reflected the underlying assumptions of an ongoing oral tradition, not only in the continued practice of
.1With apologies to Enid Blyton.
3
2The distinction between a mere congeries, and a rationally structured system,
is a crucial difference between "proverbial" and "prescriptive" norms. Cf. P. A. Sorokin,
Sociological Theories of Today (New York: Harper & Row, 1966) at 17-31.

83 'Becker (1957) at 153. See generally id. at 152-53, from which all the above
quotations are taken.
34 on the former aspect see Lord Kenyon, C.J., in R. v. Waddington (1800), 1
East. 1430, 102 E.1L 56; on the latter aspect see Lord Esher, M.R., Yarmouth v.
France (1887), 19 Q.B.D. 647, at 653-54.
25 See C. IC Allen, Law in the Making (7th ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964)
at 227-28; C. G. Moran, The Heralds of the Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 1948);

and Slater v. May (1704), 2 Ld. Raym. 1071, 92 E.R. 210.
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personal pupillage, but generally in their adherence to mechanisms of "social
learning" as ancillary to formal instruction - and indeed, until quite recently,
to the exclusion of formal instruction.36 The result is that the legal profession
still displays many of the cultural and attitudinal characteristics that go with
a "proverbial" tradition.
B.

The Prescriptive
The content of "prescriptions", like that of "proverbs", is basically
drawn from tradition; but this content is now explicitly stated, and is subjectively seen as open to further elaboration and explanation. To that extent
there is more receptiveness to change and adaptation in "prescriptions" than
in "proverbs". But such adaptations as do take place are still rather grudgingly
made; Coke's willingness to engage in "renovation", but not in "innovation",ar
neatly symbolizes the limits of adaptability here. The available leeways for
change do not go much further than a recognition that at any given time,
"prescriptions" are to be "formulated as pointedly as is possible at the time
in the given cultural context'.
Moreover, though "prescriptions", like "proverbs"e, remain not really
systematic but merely "accrete", they are further removed than are "proverbs"
from mere jumbled congeries:
. . . they are stacked, so to speak, in piles more or less orderly as contrasted
with higgledy-piggledy heaps of proverbs. Such orderliness lends itself to at least
the semblance of deductive systematization, although much more often than not
it is merely semblance. The system amounts only to a crude catalog sequence,
determined by historical happenings, convenience of memorization, or peculiarities
of the method, if any, of making some sort of record . . . in many cases the

stack is solidified by troweling deductive mortar between the joints, and a great
deal of ingenuity may be lavished on this task.

This "troweling" of deductive 'mortar" has an impact not merely on the
formal appearance presented by the materials on which the decision-maker
draws, but also on the way in which he works in using these, materials. Although the prescriptive "system" remains in fact merely "accrete"-.-- its deductive "solidification" having an "oftentimes 'afterthought' nature" - these
"afterthoughts" permit us to classify fully developed prescriptive "systems"
as "formally rational".
That is to say, "good reasons" can usually be given by their adherents for the
existence and perpetuation of every one of the parts and the totality. As we

know, the offering of "good reasons" usually amounts to nothing more than ...
rationalization or ex post facto justification, but the justification may be very
consistently carried out. Indeed, it may be a task specifically assigned to highly
trained scribes, 'priests, "doomsmen", and the like. 8

Clearly, insofar as judicial decision-making at common law is a matter of
applying a set of authoritative legal rules, these legal rules 'form precisely a
system of "prescriptions" in Becker's sense.
3

6 For the history here see W. S.. Holdsworth, A History of English Law (London:
Methuen, 1938) at 481-499; C.H.S. Fifoot Judge and Jurist'in the Reign of Victoria
(London: Stevens & Sons, 1959) at 21-28. As to the twentieth-century position in England see B. Abel-Smith & R. Stevens, Lawyers and the. Courts (London: Heinemann,
1967) ch. 7. And see infra, note 65.
37 Calvin's Case (1608), 7 Co. Rep. la, at 27a; 77 E.R: 377, at 409.
38Becker (1957) at 154, from which all the above quotations are taken..
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The PrincipWil

Although Becker's sacred/secular scale is obviously to be interpreted as
a nonmetric one, he sometimes finds it convenient (while avoiding "unduly
precise connotations") to depict it "algebraically" as ranging in effect "from
maximum plus to maximum minus, with a zero or transitional point somewhere about the middle."' 9 In a nonmetric scale no "true zero point" or
"center of indifference" between reluctance and receptiveness to change can
actually be located;40 but "from the analytic angle such a point must be
postulated". 41 "Principled decision-making" lies not quite at this postulated
point, but at the stage when "transition through the zero point occurs", and
"the secular portion of the scale begins". Here readiness to change and resistance to it are "almost in balance... but not quite". The "nature, speed,
or range" of change accepted as tolerable are still subject to "certain restrictions stemming from the sacred"; and though "proverbs" and "prescriptions" are now markedly diminished in compulsion, "a good deal of their remaining efficacy may be transferred to somewhat more abstract formulations
functioning as... principles". For all this, the crucial point is that within the
limits set by these principles, with their lingering aura of sacredness,
"there
42
is acquiescence in change, active assent to it, or even search for it."
This relative acquiescence in change is a product of the high degree of
abstractionentailed in the formulation and application of principles. Proverbs
and prescriptions are confined to "concrete?' applications, "tightly bound to
their immediate manifestations in conduct; extensive variation in the way they
are applied therefore destroys their effectiveness". The abstraction process
which leads to the emergence of principles is essentially a way of "salvaging"
the content of proverbs and prescriptions, by cutting them loose from "specific
actions enjoined or prohibited", and giving them "general bearing". The resulting secular principles
are considerably more flexible, admitting of many changes in application without
rendering them worthless .... Such abstract principles are still viewed as sacred,
for they are regarded as basically unalterable, but the scope of the circumstances
89 Id.at 143.
40
This is so even in the case of unilinear jurimetric scales, since their extreme
points are not "maximum plus" and "maximum minus", but only the most extreme
positions occurring in a particular court at a particular time; and since all measurements
in such a scale are relative to the particular group of judges being observed, there
is no way of knowing how closely (if at all) the observed extremes approximate
"maximum plus" and "maximum minus". See A.R. Blackshield, "Quantitative Analysis:
The High Court of Australia, 1964-1969" (1972), 3 Lawasia 1, at 55-56, n. 198. It
may nonetheless be worth noting here that in other researches (as yet unpublished)
of the kind there reported, I have found a certain amount of evidence that as well as
the X and Y Scales there reported, which respectively measure political and economic
conservatism and "institutional authoritarianism" in the High Court of Australia, that
Court's decisions have sometimes appeared to support the construction of a Z Scale,
which would measure degrees of willingness to depart from "strict legalism". In such
a scale some Australian judges (e.g., Sir Owen Dixon) have at times appeared to
occupy, in relation to their colleagues, a "zero point" or "centre of indifference". And
see infra, note 62.
41
Becker (1957) at 155,
42 Ibid.
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to which they have become applicable is so great that striking changes may
come about under their auspices - changes that their formulators rarely if ever
concretely envisage, but that may be foreseen as the vague 'shape of things to
come'. Presumably inviolate and inviolable, abstract principles nevertheless lend
43
themselves to changes that as time goes on may be very far-reaching indeed

The changes thus ushered in under the sanctioning shelter of "principles"
may, says Becker, be rationalized as changing "means" to enduring "ends"; or
they may be justified by deductive argument similar to that employed in applications of a prescriptive system. In either case, whether because of the
entanglement of "means" and "ends" in conceptual renderings of human
affairs, 44 or because of the tendency to "justificatory argument rather than
genuine deduction", the truth is that such interpretive judgments, though purportedly merely "pursuant" to the implementation of "principles", amount to
substantive changes of the operative value-system. These changes are reflexive
in impact: they "progressively modify the principles to which they are
pursuant".
The "vastly wider scope of change" under principled rationality is made
possible (as we have seen) by the high level of abstraction of the "principles"
employed. But the principled decision-maker must pay a price for the freedom which this abstraction offers. The converse consequence of abstraction
is that the "interpretations" which the decision-maker must give to connect
his principle "'with the concrete enactments it ostensibly sanctions must be
highly sophisticated and hence beyond the grasp of most laymen". It'may
then be difficult to convince these laymen that any "principle" whatsoeveris
still in fact being observed. 45
In other words, to locate the principled decision-maker "almost" at the
mid-point between "sacred" norm-application and "secular" creativity is to
assign him to a delicately equilibrating ground which, insofar as it can be
held at all by actual men or their institutions, can only be perilously held.
Progressive "abstraction" of precepts, ielding progressively higher "principles", cannot be continued indefinitely, but at a certain point may render

principles so rarefied in content as to become almost vacuous; and external
observers of the "principled" decision-making process may think that this
vanishing-point of "principles" has been reached even before it is subjectively
43

Id.at 156.'
44 Cf. Lon Fuller, "American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century" (1954),'6"J.Legal
Ed. 457, at 480; Lon Fuller, "Human Purpose and Natural Law" (1958), 3 Natural
L.F. 68.
45
Becker (1957) at 156-57; and see Howard Becker, Man in Reciprocity .(New
York: F.A. Praeger, 1956) at 184ff. ("Abstraction is Necessary for Principle, but
Harmful to Principle"). There is thus a rich and deeply illuminating paradox in his
suggestion (see Becker (1957) at 156) that the decisional strategies of the U.S. Supreme
Court are an example of judgment through "principles". For Becker, in 1957, was
making this suggestion just as respected legal scholars were beginning to unleash a
storm of criticism against that Court precisely for its- supposed failure to produce any
meaningful "principles" at all. See, e.g., H. M. Hart, "Comment", in M. G. Paulsen
ed., Legal Institutions Today and Tomorrow (New York: Columbia University Press,
1959) at 40; H. Wechsler, 'Towards Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law"-(1959),
73 Harv. L. Rev. 1. And see infra, note 75.
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reached in the decision-maker's own approach to his task.46 At this vanishingpoint of "principles", the balance which they represent between traditional
continuity and openness to change will be lost. Either, as the "principle" melts
away, we shall be left with merely a congeries of the concrete enactments
drawn from it, and thus relegated to "prescriptive" (or even to "proverbial")
valuations; or the last tenuous link with "sacred" tradition will be dissolved,
releasing decision-making processes into unrestricted freedom to choose an
expedient "result" in each case.
The Pragmatic

D.

Freedom to choose expedient "results" despite ubiquitous innuendoes
in jurisprudential debate, is not necessarily inconsistent with adherence to
"principles". Nor is it necessarily any less admirable than such adherence. If
the most carefully "principled" procedures may sometimes be "compatible
with very great iniquity", 47 the most brusquely "expedient" pursuit of convenient pragmatic solutions may equally be compatible with benevolence of
intention, and beneficence of result. "Expediency" may even without undue
linguistic strain be limited, by stipulative definition, to pursuit of the "transand "absolutely valid" ideals of the good, the true, and the beauempirical"
tifu". 48 And even if the ideals or purposes pursued are "fantastic" or "nonsensical", 49 "expedient" decision-making remains rational in a double sense:
first, that it must be directed to the intelligent pursuit of some ideal or purpose, and second, that it is restricted in its choice of means to the choice of
what is feasible, and likely to realize the desired ideal"... only that which
seems likely to work is put into operation"; expedient choices are restricted
"by rational judgments of instrumental efficiency",A0 If "prescriptive" decisionmaking is close to an ideal type of Max Weber's "intellectual' or "conceptual"
rationality, "pragmatic" decisions are close to an ideal type of his "efficient"
or "economic!' rationality.51
4

6 It

is at this stage of the judicial process that charges of delusion and self-

delusion begin to fly. See J.Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (New York: Brentano's,
1930) at 222-31; A. S. Miller & A. W. Scheflin, "The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication" (1960), 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 661; J.Stone, Social Dimensions
of Law and Justice (London: Stevens & Sons, 1966), at 676-87. But if an observer thinks
that a judge is using a principle so tenuous, and so remotely relevant, as to yield no

"principled decision" at all, and if the judge subjectively and sincerely believes that
he is working with a "real" principle from which his conclusions are genuinely drawn,
which view is to be taken as the truth of the matter? The real problem arises when
some observers accept at face value the illusion of a principled decision, while other
(more acute) observers, and the judge himself, know that this is merely illusion.
47
48

See H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961) at 202.

See Gustav Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie (6th ed. Stuttgart: K. F. Koehler
Verlag, 1963) at 147; and English translation in K. Wilk ed., The Legal Philosophies
of Lask, Radbruch, and Dabin (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950)
at 91.
40 Becker (1957) at 159.
00 Id.at 158.
51
See Max Weber, Wirtschaft and Gesellschaft (2nd ed. Tilbingen: J.C. B. Moar,
1925) at 395-97, 412, 456 if., 468 ff., 492-93, 661 ff.; and English translation in Max
Rheinstein ed., Weber on Law in Economy and Society (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1954) at 61-64, 96-97, 198 ff., 224 ff., 276-78, 350 ff. And see A. R.
Blackshield, "A Pelican in the Wilderness" (1966), 19 J. Legal Ed. 127, at 155 et. seq.
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The contrast of "pragmatic" with "principial" decisions is, therefore,
simply that the latter are "rationally limited" not only in the means employed,
but also "in the ends toward which they may be directed; consistency with
presumably unalterable principles is demanded."5 2 By contrast, "expedient
rationality" is that which has been freed of restrictions imposed by this last
kind of demand; expediency 53 "means only acting in such ways as to free,
release, or extricate - to remove hampering restrictions". Expedient rationality is a "result-oriented" or (in Becker's term) a "consequent" rationality;
but at the level of means (whether or not at the level of ends) it is still a
rationality.
Yet, in a sense, the habits of speech which flatly oppose "expediency"
to "principle" are after all justified. It is empirically true that often in human
affairs, decision-makers choose "expediency" either because of impatience
with the fetters of "principle", or because of traumatic emergencies which
make adherence to principles no longer a viable option.5 4 The kinds of
decision-makers who manifest impatience with principles are frequently likely
to be men not committed to benevolent ideals; the kinds of crisis-situations
giving rise to trauma are even more frequently likely to be unreceptive to the
flourishing of such "abstract" commitments. 55 To that extent only, it is true
to say that unprincipled procedures are likely to have an empirical "affinity"
for evil purposes.5 6
E.

The Pronormless

More unambiguously open to rational condemnation are choices "so
remote from even formal rationality" that it is no longer possible to distinguish "means" from "ends". Both means and ends are now "so heavily
charged with emotion as to be "strikingly" irrational - "counter-rational,
rather than merely nonrational". Such choices, says Becker, are oriented to
"at least two types" of means (or ends?) of personal gratification: "the comfortable and the thrilling". 57 In either case, the result is almost - but not quite
"normlessness".
, * . persons flinging themselves into the nonrational pursuit of the new as new
overstep most if not all proverbial, prescriptive, and principial limits; indeed,
even the rational requirements of consequently secular conduct exercise little or
no control .... [A] high proportion of the previously functioning norms, whether
merely "external" or "internalized" . . . are evaded, disregarded, altered, or
flouted . . . . This relative normlessness reaches beyond the form and content

of the norms themselves in that the connections ....

linking the norms into

some ascertainable kind of system, weaken rapidly, fluctuate, or almost vanish
52

Becker (1957) at 158.
Etymologically linked with the Latin expedire, "to free the feet".
54
Becker (1957) at 157.
55 On totalitarian and other disruptive potentialities here, see id. at 158; and the
fuller discussion in Becker, op.cit.supra note 13, at 281-305.
5
6 See on Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964)
at 153-55, 157-59; Lon Fuller, "A Reply to Professors Cohen and Dworkin" (1965), 10
Vill.L.Rev. 655, esp. at 664. But in any wider sense than the above, claims for this
sort of "affinity" remain extremely hazardous. See H. L. A. Hart, Book Review (1965),
78 Harv.L.Rev. 1281; A. R. Blackshield, Book Review (1965), 20 U.Va.Reading Guide
11. And see supra, note 47.
57
Becker (1957) at 159.
53
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[T]he accrete character of proverbial and prescriptive value-systems, the at
least ostensibly deductive . . . character of principial value-systems, and even
the rationally means-restricted character of consequent value-systems are so
fundamentally changed by the hither-and-yon search for transitory
and discon58
nected ends ... as hardly to warrant use of the term "system".
....

Yet - at any rate so far as we are concerned with social decisions, or with
any decisions having more than a purely personal significance for the pleasureloving individual - total normlessness is simply inconceivable. A society, or
the makers of its decisions and ideologies, may "favor a normless state of
affairs"; but in fact "needs and their correlative values are never utterly discrete, never wholly 'private', never completely at random, never without
functioning system." The most we can say is that decision-making may
59
be "pronormless", meaning that it is shaped by an aspiration
to total
60
normlessness.
III. THE "SACRED" AND THE "SECULAR" IN JUDGMENT
AND JURISPRUDENCE

To ask which of the preceding five types of decisional apparatus offers
the "correct" pigeonhole into which legal decisions "fit" would be, of course,
to ask a misconceived and meaningless question.61 Actual subcultural
"blocks" of human evaluative experience legal, moral, managerial and
other - will each have their own version of the sacred-secular "scale", any
empirical instance being potentially located at any point upon it. A body of
evaluative experience such as that of judicial decision-making, in which innumerable instances succeed one another in institutionalized continuity, will

seem in long-term historical perspective to wander back and forth along the
scale; and while this wandering may at some broad levels of analysis be
amenable to interpretation and presentation in terms of pendulum swing, 62 at
other (more closely historical) levels it may seem simply erratic.
58 1d. at 160, from which the following quotations are also taken.
59 See Blackshield, supra note 6, at 18, 21-22.
60 Cf. D. Lloyd, The Idea of Law (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964) at 14-24;
Stone, op.cit. supra note 46, at 473-78.
61
See supra, note 15.
6
2 See Paul Weiler, In the Last Resort (Toronto: Carswell/Methuen, 1974), e.g.
at 227, arguing that in the 1950s the Supreme Court of Canada, while working through
the medium of highly prescriptive judgments, was in fact consistently "groping towards,
and. .. gradually achieving" a substantive principial output, but that in the 1960s the
Court "regressed" to pure prescriptivism. (He sees signs of "another fundamental
change" for the 1970s.) Exactly the same recession from the 'principial" style of the
fifties to a disappointing "prescriptivism" in the 1960s has been true, to a very striking
degree, for the High Court of Australia. See Blackshield, supra note 40, at 12-13.
Moreover, in both these national courts, the sixties' "prescriptivism" has masked an
even more disappointing reliance on "proverbialism", along with a (sometimes rather
uneasy) attempt at pragmatism. More intriguingly still, the 1950s, which were thus in
both Canada and Australia a high point for "principled" judgment, were in Britain
(especially in the House of Lords) a decade of the most rigid "prescriptivisr" for
many years; and the 1960s, which in the Dominions have seen a falling away from
"principles", have in Britain seen their triumphant return. No doubt these pendulum
swings are due in part to the influence merely of dominant individual judges: Rand
in Canada, (and Laskin de praesenti et futuro), Dixon in Australia, Reid (and perhaps
more recently Diplock) in the House of Lords. But significant factors of "period style",
reflecting wider cultural movements, seem also to be involved.
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Moreover, a single body of decisions, proceeding from a single institution or group in a single cultural and temporal context, may seem to occupy
simultaneously two inconsistent places on Becker's continuum. In particular,
if we take his "principled" mid-point as the ideal, it is possible that a decisionmaking individual or group may seem to fall short of this ideal in both directions at once. 68
Nevertheless, it seems possible to venture some assertions about the
places on the continuum which common-law judicial processes (and scholarly
views concerning these) have occupied from time to time.
At least in terms of judges' aspirations and self-perceptions, the "normal" location of common law judgment appears to vacillate between the
prescriptive, and the "principled". But achievement and aspiration do not
always coincide. In the following sketch of how our typology might be applied to an overall view of empirical judicial behaviour, we must be advertent
both to ways in which judges implement their prescriptive and principial
aspirations, and to ways in which they veer off in proverbial or pragmatic
directions, or in both directions at once.
For example, where adherence to legal tradition (or to some broader
national or cultural tradition) is particularly strong as a value, the prescriptive
procedures which are normal for judges may tend to gravitate towards the
merely proverbial. Alternatively, this may happen where (as in pioneer or
"frontier" societies) a sense of cultural isolation and a sharing of common
hardships binds judges, lawyers and laymen together in a strong sense of
community.6 4 (This is only to say that "proverbial" patterns of judgment may
flourish either in very old or in very new societies.) In either context, the
tendency to proverbialism will be reinforced if these cultural values are
coupled with adherence to the common lawyer's faith in techniques of
empirical problem-solving that do not transcend the concrete context of each
individual case. We have seen that common law techniques of legal education
(or professional socialization) may also encourage proverbialism, 65 and so
63

See Becker (1957) at 158, observing that totalitarian systems "unite, in seemingly incongruous but none the less effective ways, both rigid prescription and farreaching expediency".
64
See id. at 164-72, emphasizing the crucial role in the shaping or dissolving of
"sacred" allegiance (and hence of "proverbial" judgment) which is played by "vicinal,
social, and mental" isolation. Perhaps the Canadian achievement (on the whole an
enviable one) in retaining, in the midst of an advanced post-industrial culture, many
of the cultural ideals and attitudes of a frontier society, may help to explain the
relatively high degree of "proverbialism" which appears to be a distinctive feature of
Canadian judicial performance.
65See supra, note 36. This, too, for all but the newest generation of Canadian
judges, might be a reason for a very high degree of proverbialism. See H. Arthurs,
"The Canadian Legal Profession in Transition", in J. Ziegel ed., Law and Social Change

(Toronto: Osgoode Hall Law School/York University, 1973) at 1, esp. at 3-9. To

paraphrase Dean Arthurs' thesis in the present terminology, he is arguing that (save
for a handful of men) Canadian legal education as late as 25 years ago was still wholly
proverbial; and that prescriptive, principial and pragmatic patterns and ideals have all
burst upon Canadian law schools together within the past generation. This would not
explain the strong current of pragmatism in many Canadian judgments, nor the qualified
triumph of "principles" in the Supreme Court of Canada for a time in the 1950s. (See
supra, note 62.) But it would certainly explain why so much proverbialism has mingled
with those other currents.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 12, No. 3

also (at least insofar as we take them seriously) would recurring expressions
of sceptical distrust of legal theory, and especially of "logic". 66
Insofar as any or all of these factors operate to determine the values
and drives of the legal culture, and hence the attitudes of lawyers and judges
as they are shaped by that culture, such attitudes must inevitably fall short
even of the minimal "semblance of deductive systematization" which is
necessary to the maintenance of prescriptive rationality. Instead of deduction,
judgment will turn on intuition, whose grounds are absorbed and expressible
only through folklore. 67 Instead of systematic prescriptive structures (or
rather, alongside of and disconcertingly commingled with them), the authoritative legal materials will incorporate "higgledy-piggledy" heaps of hybrid
concepts 8 which are often stubbornly resistant to rational systematization,
and depend for their workability on traditional lawyers' intuitions.
Yet common law judgment can never be wholly confined to proverbial
patterns. In every case which he decides, the common law judge is under a
compelling institutional duty owed to litigants and counsel, to other judges
and to the legal tradition itself, to explain his reasons for judgment clearly;
to formulate his norms "as pointedly as possible . . .in the given cultural
context".6 9 This duty presses on all judges; but most exigently on those who
sit on the appellate bench. Its consequence is that if their decisions can never
entirely escape the "proverbial" roots of the common law, they can never
wholly sink back into "proverbialism", either. The professional role assumed
by the judge drives him almost inevitably to find his core concept of judicial
duty in prescriptive rationality, and to act accordingly. And if, on the one
side, this rationality wavers towards the merely proverbial, on the other side
it is constantly impelled towards the principial. In part this is because the
pressure of exigent human problems (which, even if they cannot be solved,
must judicially be "managed" somehow) is constantly impelling the judge
to strain his available prescriptive materials to - and beyond - the limits
of their adaptability. In part it is because the prescriptive materials themselves
through inherent possibilities and ambiguities; through contradictions
which cannot be resolved by applying the "deductive mortar" of a prescriptive
system, and must therefore be transcended by appeal to a higher plane of
abstraction; and above all through the pervasive drive for "reasoned elabora06

See Stone, op.cit. supra note 11, at 230.
One illuminating application of the present typology ,might be to debates concerning the almost uncontrolled discretions which arise from. such practices as, plea
bargaining, selective prosecution, and the like. Concern about such practices is generally
directed to the fear that, through them, the "prescriptive". ideal of equal justice through
law may teeter over into (at best) the pragmatic, and (at worst) the pronormless. But
perhaps our concern should rather be that such practices'cause law enforcement to
teeter in the opposite direction: away from principle and pragmatism, into "intuitive"
and hence unexaminable judgments, based on nothing more than a folklore tradition
which may well import values quite other than those we would rationally wish to
pursue. (I am here indebted to a suggestion made by my student Ms. Carmen Williams.)
Certainly, the plea-bargaining prosecutor is more like the priest of a "sacred" system
than the playboy of a "secular" one.
08 Trust? Quasi-contract? Assumpsit?
.
09
Becker (1957) at 154.
67
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tion" which prescriptive norms reflect, but cannot fulfil - both invite and
encourage "principialization" of their ideas.70
Normally, then, both through external challenges and through inherent
drives for "principle", common law judgment has been prescriptive, tending
to the principial. But it follows from this that for some courts, at some
periods of their history, external challenges may be so constant and so large
in implication, and inherent drives in the material to be used in justification
may be so wide and pervasive, that the movement into "principled" decisions
becomes virtually complete. In such a transition, the quality of the tasks that
the court is typically called upon to perform may be decisive; 71 and so may
the relative quantities of different kinds of qualitative tasks which arise for
disposition. Courts of constitutional review, accustomed to facing challenges
of sweeping social and political significance, and required to deal with these
on the basis of prescriptive materials whose prescriptions are framed in
fundamental - if not monumental - terms, are here especially challenged
to something more than mere prescription. Familiar observations on the special techniques required in cases where "it is a constitution that we are
interpreting" 72 take on a new significance in the light of Becker's spectrum;
and so do observations on the contrast between the Supreme Court of the
United States (whose work now lies almost wholly in the constitutional field),
and other supreme tribunals like those of Canada and Australia (which combine such tasks with those of "ordinary" appellate review) .7 In "ordinary"
appellate tasks, even a high appellate court is still pulled by the nature of the
material with which it works (and of the problems upon which it works)
towards the precise deductive analysis of prescriptive decision-making, and
even towards the piecemeal intuitions of the proverbial. In tasks of judicial
review, the pull is in the other direction.
Accordingly, a court which is habitually required to work in both these
fields may be expected, even in its most prescriptively-oriented work, to
show more awareness of and sensitivity to "principles" than would represent
the norm for common law courts not thus doubly burdened; while even in
70

See Stone, op.cit. supra note 11, ch.7 passim.

71 The nascent experience of the Supreme Court of Canada with the Bill of Rights
is an obvious example; and initial judicial reluctances to respond to the challenge are

only to be expected. See Weler, opcit.supra note 62, at 195 ff., 227. And see A. R.
Blackshield, "'Fundamental Rights' and the Institutional Viability of the Indian Supreme

Court" (1966), 8 J. Indian L. Inst. 139, at 164, 169, 190-217, on the similar experience
with "fundamental rights" litigation in the Supreme Court of India - as to which see
now the remarkable judgment of Matthew, J., in Kesavananda v. State of Kerala,
A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461.
72
See Marshall, CJ., in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, at 407

(1819).

7
3 See e.g., in the Australian literature Sir Owen Dixon, Address at Annual Dinner
of Am. Bar Ass'n. (1942), 16 Austl. LJ. 192 at 194-95 (also in Sir Owen Dixon,
Jesting Pilate and Other Papers and Addresses (Sydney: Law Book Co. of Australasia,
1965) at 100, esp. at 104); G. Sawer, 'The Supreme Court and the High Court of
Australia' (1957), 6 1. Pub. L. 482, at 488; S. H. Kadish, "Judicial Review in the High
Court and the United States Supreme Court" (1959), 2 Melbourne U.L. Rev. 4 (Pt. I)

127 (Pt. II), at 153; R. Else-Mitchell, Essays on the Australian Constitution (2d ed.

Sydney: Law Book Co. of Australasia, 1961) at xxx.
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the largest issues of judicial review, attitudes and methodologies grounded
in its prescriptive tasks will hold it short of full commitment to Becker's model
of "principles". By contrast, a court not regularly subjected to the restraints
of work in the prescriptive domain may be expected to shift more readily, and
more completely, to "principled" commitment relatively unchecked by such
restraints. For the Supreme Court of the United States, therefore, "principled
decision-making" in Becker's sense would represent (almost) the norm.
In short, some courts may lie very close to exact correspondence with
the ideal type of prescriptive rationality; others may lie equally close to
"principled" rationality. Those which are most prescriptive may sometimes (as
in Canada) tend to become merely proverbial; may those which are most
"principled" tend sometimes to be merely expedient? It is clear that over the
past two decades many highly respected critics of the United States Supreme
Court have seen this at least as a possibility, and that a responsible critic
could tenably find grounds to believe (or at least to fear) that the Supreme
Court in fact underwent such a shift during the 1950s. For example, Herbert
Wechsler's notable plea in 1959 for return to "neutral principles" in American constitutional legislation74 - despite the exasperating imprecisions in his
presentation of it 7r - can really be assigned to a quite precise location on
our continuum: what he was trying to say was simply that the Supreme Court
should go beyond prescriptive to "principled" rationality, but that it should
not go further into expedient rationality. Given what has here been called the
delicate equilibration of the "principled" model, this location in fact suffices
to make overall sense of Wechsler's position. For the apparent inconsistencies
of that position, the opposite directions of its potential implications, and even
Martin Shapiro's charge that Wechsler was simply "trying to have his cake
and eat it too", 70 are thus finally resolved - or at least explained.
If we ask, however, whether the Supreme Court has in fact made the
kind of shift into pragmatism here contemplated - or, indeed, whether any
court of law ever makes such a shift - the answer is that this is rather
doubtful. No doubt one of the forces which the equilibration of "principles"
holds in tension is a constant pull towards the merely pragmatic; no doubt,
too, any court committed to working with "principles" may sometimes
succumb to this shift, handing down a decision in which (consciously or unconsciously) it has allowed pragmatic inclinations to prevail. But precisely
because such a court is committed to "principles", such a case is unlikely to
signal a shift from this commitment. What has happened is merely that this
commitment has faltered or failed in a given case, Case1 . In the next case,
Case., the commitment to principle is taken up as before, with the same
74

Supra note 45.

75

See M. Shapiro, "The Supreme Court and Constitutional Adjudication: Of

Politics and Neutral Principles" (1963), 31 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 587; Miller & Scheflin,
supra note 46; M. P. Golding, "Principled Decision-Making and the Supreme Court"
(1963), 63 Colum. L. Rev. 35; Stone, op. cit. supra note 11, at 316-21.
7
6 Shapiro, op. cit., supra, note 75, at 592n.
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hazards, the same tension -

or suspension

-

between prescription and

pragmatism, but also with the same judicial search for "genuine principle".
Again there is the possibility of merely expedient disposition; but this possibility is in no way augmented or enhanced by the fact that the same possibility happened to be realized in Case,. If anything - at least where Case,
was decided in a knowingly pragmatic way - the effect of experience with
Case1 may reinforce the determination that Case, (and Case,) are to be
decided by strict implementation of principle.
In terms of Becker's scale, therefore, prescription and "principle" mark
opposite ends of the normality - and also the full propriety - of the judicial
process as it is actually practised. In particular cases, or even in particular
countries at a particular time, prescription may degenerate de facto into a
mere adherence to proverbial tradition; or "principle" into pragmatism. Divergences from "normality" may even occur in both these directions at once;
many Canadian judges, for instance, appear to a foreign observer to display,
in their judicial style, an unusual combination of the proverbial and the
pragmatic.7 7 The result, in both proverbial and pragmatic manifestations, is
an impressive record of achievement in intuitively "sound" disposition of
concrete factual problems, but (for many judges) a tendency to flounder
when abstract conceptual or analytical problems demand the exercise of
prescriptive or principial skills. Yet even such national deviations from common law "normalcy" seem not to reflect a systematically adopted departure
from the prescriptive and principial aspirations of judges. To say that the
proverbial, prescriptive, principial, and pragmatic models must all be taken
into account as we survey historical and national variations in the style of
judicial decisions, is only to say that the merely proverbial and the merely
pragmatic represent the points of cut-off or fade-out for such variations.
This would mean that in a scale of divergent judicial approaches as
empirically found, Becker's pronormless non-rationality would be left wholly
out of account. No doubt, just as responsible critics of the United States
Supreme Court in the fifties and sixties were able to maintain that the Court
had fallen into mere pragmatism, its irresponsible critics were able to maintain (and did!) that the Court had rushed into "pragmatic" approaches in
such a headlong manner as to be propelled into normlessness, or at least
pronormlessness. Clearly, however, such charges need not be taken seriously.
"Pronormless" decisions, in Becker's account, are merely "whim decrees"; 78
the pronormless decision-maker is one who accompanies his choices with the
79
flatly defiant challenge: "I like it because I like it, and what's to stop me?"
It seems highly unlikely that any court - even among those most wholly subservient to totalitarian rule - has ever carried expediency to these extreme
lengths, treating judgments merely as "whim decrees" in the light of what is
"comfortable" or "thrilling!'. Certainly in the non-totalitarian systems with
77

See supra notes 62, 64-65.

78

Becker (1957) at 160.

79 Id. at 159.
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which we are concerned, such judicial abandonment of any form of rationality
seems wholly inconceivable - at least in appellate courts!e°
When, however, we turn from discussion of actual judicial attitudes, to
discussion of jurists' and legal philosophers' appraisals and aspirations with
regard to modes of judgment, our whole scale must undergo a perceptible
shift. At the extreme traditionalist end of the scale, legal theorists prepared
to assert that judicial decision-making is a merely proverbial process are few
and far between. Even Bacon's famous reduction of the judge's materials to
a mere proverbial collocation of "distinct and dis-joyned Aphorismes" (and
his corresponding eschewal of a prescriptive model "which would have made
every particular rule through coherence and relation unto other rules seeme
more cunning and deep") was coupled with (and justified by) an expressed
desire to leave future judgments "more free to turn and tosse".81 And even
von Savigny's arch-traditionalist theory of the Volksgeist was coupled with 8a2
recognition of the sophisticated "technical element" of juristic articulation.
The law of the Volksgeist itself might be (and clearly was) merely proverbial;
but lawyers and judges were to bring to the proverbial materials a "systematic"
spirit through which alone it was possible "to view every notion and every
rule in lively connection and co-operation with the whole".8 3 His stand against
codification might conceivably be taken to imply that law (as he knew it)
should not proceed beyond the prescriptive to the principial; and, of course,
his concept of "people's law" was a proverbial one. But that lawyers' and
judges' law must be prescriptive and not proverbial was a crucial part of
his doctrine.
Only with Savigny's American disciple James Coolidge Carter do we find
explicit affirmation of proverbial tradition as constituting the very stuff of
judicial decision-making. Even in Carter's account of judgment, the proverbial
substratum is overlaid with elements of prescriptive (and even principial)
80

The cynicism of a Jeremy Bentham might lead us to say that common law
judges can and do reach decisions merely on the basis of personal "whim". The eleven
volumes of J. Bowring ed., Works of Jeremy Bentham (Edinburgh: W. Tait, 18381843) are replete with instances of Bentham's extreme views in this respect: see, e.g.,
in vol. 5 (at 53) J. Bentham, Letters on the Proposed Reform in the Administration
of Civil Justice in Scotland (the "Scotch Reform" letters, 1808) at 59-60; and also (at
231) J.Bentham, Truth against Ashhurst (1792). In vol. 2 (at 1) see J.Bentham,
Principlesof JudicialProcedure (first published posthumously, 1837) at 7-8, 19-20; and
in vol. 11 see J.Bentham, Letter to the Duke of Wellington (1816) at 9. Bentham, of
course, was irrational in his hostilities on this matter; but every jurisdiction has
anecdotes ascribing to one or two judges a posture not far short of "whim". What
would save appellate courts, even then, from this sort of charge is not necessarily their
greater integrity, but simply their collegiate composition. One can conceive of one man
following pronormless "whim" in his decisions; but the idea of nine men, or even five,
all following
the same whim is itself rather whimsical.
81
Sir Francis Bacon, Maxims of the Common Laws of England (written 1597; first
published posthumously, London: Assignes of J.More, 1630) at 10; also published in
Lord Bacon's Law Tracts (2d ed. London: Dan. Browne, 1741) at 31.
82F. K. von Savigny, Vom Beruf unsrer Zeit far Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft (Heidelberg: J.C.B. Mohr, 1814), as translated by A. Hayward in F. K. von
Savigny, On the Vocation of Our Age for Legislation and Jurisprudence (London:
Littlewod & Co., 1831) at 7-9 and passim.
s3ld. at 64-65.
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imputation, so as to shift it at any rate close to the prescriptive; yet we
should probably concede that notwithstanding these partial overlays, his picture of the judicial decision remained a proverbial one, with precedents old
and new representing merely the "declaration", "authentication", or "enforcement" of custom.8 4 Despite all the concessions to orthodoxy to which
he was impelled,8 5 it seems clear from the overall mood and drive of his
argument 8 that he did intend literally to take his stand upon "proverbialism".
To that extent his theory would stand as a solitary (if unconvincing and
self-deceptive) exception to the generalization now to be hazarded.
This is that one can scarcely conceive of any legal theorist presenting the
task of judicial decision as merely proverbial, since the very enterprise of
84 J. C. Carter, Law: Its Origin, Growth and Function (New York: G.P. Putnam's
Sons, 1907) at 65, 313.
85He did concede (id. at 65) that judicial pronouncements might wean "enlightened" society away from merely proverbial attitudes, causing custom to be "settled"
and "regulated", and conflicting practices to be "discredited and pass away". But he
insisted that this could come about only if judicial decisions were "correct... that is,
if the true custom is chosen" (meaning "the one most consistent with the largest
usage"). He conceded, too (at 67-68), that in "full enlightenment" judicial institutions
proliferate into elaborate hierarchies with complex jurisdictional rules, staffed by (and
approached through) men of "special professional education"; and he gave full weight
to the "many thousands of volumes" of reports and treatises, and the intricate classificatory systems of cognition, employed by such men "to aid them in their duties",
But he still insisted (at 69) that the purpose of these thousands of volumes was merely
to furnish a record of authenticated custom. He conceded, finally (at 70-74, esp. 73),
that there may be cases where even this "prodigious" record of custom fails, since "the
question has never before arisen"; that the appellate court in such cases typically
remarks "that the case.., must be decided upon principle - a vague expression, but
correct enough"; and that "some would say" that in such cases "the judges had made
the law out of their own heads, upon a simple consideration of whether the (defendant's
conduct) was right or wrong". But for his own part he argued that even here common
"custom" was really decisive. For "whose notion of right and wrong was it? It did
not come from on High. It was not sought for in the Scriptures, or in any book of
ethics. The judges in considering whether the act was right or wrong applied to it the
method universally adopted by all men; they judged it by its consequences . ... If
we went no further it would be manifest that custom decided the case, for to determine
whether it was right or wrong by the customary modes of determining right and wrong
is to determine it according to custom. The court, indeed, declared that its decision
was made upon principle; but what is meant by this? What is the import of this word
'principle'? It has various meanings, but as here employed it denotes a proposition
very widely true, and the truth of which is universally admitted." From these last two
words, he then spun an assertion that any "principle of law" could be such "only because it accorded with the universal custom of men"; and that the procedure of
logical deduction from such a principle, though "sometimes supposed to be peculiar
to the law", is itself an adherence to custom, since it conforms to "the mode, and the
only mode, in which the human mind acts when it engages in reasoning". To concede
the presence of prescriptive, principial, and even pragmatic methods of decision, but
then to maintain a stubborn insistence that all of these are really dependent exclusively
on "custom", is certainly a strange way of arguing that all judgments are merely
"proverbial" - especially when the argument can only be made by crude play on the
words "custom" and "customary" taken in senses different from each other as well
as from the "proverbial" sense. But, whatever we think of Carter's execution, his
intention seems unmistakable.
88 Cf. id. at 310 ff., esp. at 312; and see J.C. Carter, "The Ideal and the Actual in
the Law" (1890), 24 Am.L.Rev. 752.
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constructing a legal theory involves a commitment to rationality which suffices
to carry even the most conservative mind at least to the stage of adopting
a prescriptive model of judgment. We may, indeed, go so far as to say that
the normal model of theorizing about the judicial process - even for "legalists" - would be in terms of the maximum possible degree of rational
procedure: that is, in terms of "principles" rather than of mere prescriptions.
It is not for nothing that Sir William Blackstone's model of law - in which
"everywhere... 'principles' were waiting to be found 87 - has become a
kind of archetypical symbol of Anglo-American "legalism". Insofar as the
"legalist" does recoil from the openness of "principles", he is likely to turn
not ,to blind insistence on proverbial tradition, but to acceptance at face value
of the prescriptive moders semblance of precise and unambiguous clarity of
statement in its individual norms, and of orderly patterns of deductive reasoning and systematic cohesion linking the norms into rational unity. The
extreme "legalist", in other words, is likely to stress precisely those features
of the prescriptive model which most sharply and emphatically distinguish
it from the proverbial.
For the "realist", on the other hand, even the openness of "principles"
is likely to seem too restrictive of the creative resources which he seeks to
ascribe to the judicial process. The picture he draws will usually lie close to
our present ideal type of "pragmatism", with no restraints save "instrumental
efficiency": the choice of means that are feasible, and likely to realize
effectively the judge's chosen goals. It accords with this that the writings
most distinctively characteristic of American legal realism were in general
agreement that judicial goals should be set and pursued by "scientific" procedures - involving especially behavioural aspects of sociology and psychology, along with quantitative and statistical fact-gathering of all kinds.88
For "science" in all its forms is the embodiment of expedient rationality:
"only those evaluations yielding prediction and control, regardless of other
ends, are scientifically relevant".8 9
The extreme legal realist, indeed (Scandinavian or American), may
occasionally display a certain tendency to rush in where even the most
"pragmatist" of judges refuse to tread: into ebullient proclamations of "pronormlessness". Such proclamations - leading to what R. W. Dox called
"dice box jurisprudence" 0 0 - were perhaps clearest in the almost Augustinian
confessions of Judge Hutcheson;91 and Jerome Frank, in his more exuberant
87

See D. Boorstin, The Mysterious Science of the Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Har-

vard Press 1941) at 20.
88

See F. V. Cahill, JudicialLegislation (New York: Ronald Press, 1952) at 11321; G. Tarello, 1i Realismo Giuridico Americano (Milan: Giuffr6, 1962) at 41-43;
63-67; .G. Reuschlein, Jurisprudence: Its American Prophets (Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill, 1951) at 275-87 (and cf. generally id. at 307-27). Sadly this most valuable

(though least novel) of American realist concerns has been the one most often
pilloried. See, e.g., A.L. Goodhart, "Some American Interpretations of Law", in W.I.

Jenings ed., Modern Theories of Law (London: Oxford University Press, 1933) at 1,
esp. at 15-17; and the Harvard faculty frolic revived in Tarello, op.cit. supra, at 204n.
80
Becker
0

(1957) at 159.
91. W. Dox, "Dice Box Jurisprudence" (1932), 5 Lincoln L. Rev. 1.

01 J.C. Hutcheson, 'The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the 'Hunch' in
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moments, was only one step behind. Frank's position (like Carter's at the
opposite, "proverbial" extreme) is, however, a complex one, difficult to
locate precisely at any point on Becker's scale.
His flirtations with "pronormlessness" sprang mainly from discontentment with the -views of men like Gray and Cardozo, 92 Pound and hering,
Demogue and Wurzel. 93 All of these had acknowledged the illusoriness of
rule-bound thinking; none of them had gone far enough in abandonment of
the acknowledged illusion to satisfy Frank's demands. Accordingly the main
theme of his Law and the Modern Mind became a call for "complete liberation"; 94 for recognition that "all legal rules, principles, precepts, concepts,
standards - al generalized statements of law - are fictions"; 95 for "a more
adult attitude towards chance and change"; 96 and above all for emulation of
Holmes, the one "completely adult jurist". 97
Along with these reiterated calls, however, were many caveats, making
it clear that Frank's advocacy of "complete liberation" was not after all intended as advocacy of "normlessness". "Rules and principles" were still to be
allowed some function, provided that this was not "mechanical" nor allembracing.98 Abandonment of "an infantile hope of absolute legal certainty"
was to be sought not merely because "liberation" was psychologically
"healthy", releasing the "inherent spontaneity" and "wakeful vitality" from
which "true growth" can proceed; but because such abandonment would
"augment markedly the amount of actual legal certainty". The "complete
liberation" that Frank envisaged was in the end to yield "not... a policy of
incessant, hectic change, but a policy of healthy and vital growth", "a balanced, not an anarchic, attitude towards law"; neither "too much change"
nor "too much rigidity". 99
All this suggests that Frank himself was wavering between two theories
of the judicial process. In his "balanced" moments, he was merely restating
Judicial Decisions" (1929), 14 Cornell L.Q. 274; J.C. Hutcheson, "Lawyer's Law, and
the Little, Small Dice" (1932), 7 Tul.L.Rev. 1.
92
Frank, op.cit. supra note 46, at 32-41, 236-39.
9s ld. at 207-31.
94 Id.at 82.
95 Id.at 167. In the original the entire phrase quoted above is italicized. But it is
preceded by the phrase "in a sense", also italicized.
96 Id.at 248.
97 ld. at 253ff.

98 d.at 131-32, 278. Both passages include an assertion that: 'To deny that a cow
consists of grass is not to deny the reality of grass or that the cow eats it. So while
rules are not the only factor in the making of law, i.e. decisions, that is not to say
there are no rules". But just as the apparent assertion of pronormlessness quoted supra,
note 95, is drawn back from such extremism by the words "in a sense", so this "cowed"
abjuration of pronormlessness is drawn back towards what it abjures by the words
"law,99i.e. decisions."
On legal certainty see id. at 159; on "true" and "healthy" growth see id. at 25051 (and cf. id. at 245). See also id. at 140 n., where Frank takes it upon himself to
deliver a similar unsolicited caveat against reading Hutcheson's 1929 article (supra,
note 91) "with complete literalness". Hutcheson, he thinks, "would surely admit" that
"rules, principles and the like" are more important than Hutcheson concedes.
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our own initial antinomy between "legalism" and "realism", between conservation and change. 100 At these moments he would finally be at one with
his only partly "liberated" forerunners, men like Pound and Cardozo. Yet
mere antinomic statements customarily yield mental comfort, rather than
mental clarity;' 0 ' and Frank's drive is above all a search for a clearly-stated
position, if need be (and perhaps even preferably!) a mentally uncomfortable
one. In the moments when he most fervently states his own deep-rooted
beliefs, he is at one with Hutcheson rather than with Pound; 10 2 and in these
moments, like Hutcheson, he is drawn to language of which the implicit
yearnings, and sometimes the explicit connotations, tend to be those of
"pronormlessness".
This term, it will be recalled, does not mean that total absence of norms
is asserted as empirically found. It means only that such total normlessness
is asserted as desirable. And not only for Frank or Hutcheson, but for legal
theorists in general, 0 3 this concern with what is desirable may be the final
key to an overall understanding of the odd divergence between our scaling
of the judicial process as it actually is, and our scaling of the theories purporting to tell us how it is.
For, as we have here already suggested,10 4 theories of the judicial process
are often at least as concerned to proffer value-standards of how decisions
ought ideally to be reached, as they are to proffer descriptions of how their
authors think that such decisions are actually reached. Statements thus
proffered may well be given to flights of exaggeration, of a kind not uncommon in the expression of moral aspirations for unattainable ideals. It may
even be essential to the effectiveness of an ideal that it should be unattainable.' 05 Such exaggerations may therefore be sometimes the result of a
deliberate inflation of desires, thought needful to obtain even modest results:
the assumption is not that judges given an inch of freedom are likely to take
100

See, supra, text following note 18; and see Frank, op. cit. supra, note 46, at

252n., adopting as a final statement of the properly "adult" attitude the identical
passage from Whitehead in which Cardozo (supra, note 8) had found the philosophical
ground for his version of the antinomy.
101 See Stone, op. cit., supra, note 11, at 232, observing that most antinomic approaches "have tended finally to end by softening with appropriate indeterminacies
the divergent drives."
102 Cf. Symposium, "Modem Trends in Jurisprudence" (1934) 7 Am.L.SRev. 1057,
for a striking union of Frank and Hutcheson in common cause against Pound.

103 The fact that Hutcheson's theories were offered from the bench, and that
Frank's were later carried to it, is an additional complication for our present attempt
to "scale" judges' manifestations of attitudes towards the judicial process, and theorists'
attitudes to it, as different phenomena. To insist that what judges do is one thing, and
what theorists say about judges is another, is only a beginning of clarity; and the
present analysis may thus seem to confuse as well as ilumine. For full clarity, we
should have to distinguish further between what judges do, and what they themselves
say they do; while the problematics of analysing positions like those of Frank and
Carter suggest that even we turn to theorists, we may need to distinguish between what
they are actually saying, and what they themselves say they are saying!
104 See, supra, text following footnote 18.
105 Cf. A.D. Lindsay, The Two Moralities (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1940);
Fuller, op.cit. supra, note 56, at 51-15.
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an ell, but that only when urged to take an ell are they likely to take even
an inch.
Whatever the causes, the result can be stated in a simple and symmetrical manner. The normal range of shifts in actual adjudicative approaches
may be said to be between the prescriptive and the principial. Its prescriptive
phases may sometimes become extended or exaggerated into the merely
proverbial; its principial phases may sometimes crumble into the merely
pragmatic. By contrast the normal range of shifts in jurisprudential theories
about these phenomena is between the principial and the pragmatic. Theorizing
in its principial phase may sometimes be exaggerated into the prescriptive;
theorizing in its pragmatic phase may sometimes be exaggerated into the
pronormless. In the actual practice of judgment pronormlessness, save in the
rarest and most eccentric of instances, is an empty category, for which no
empirical examples are likely to be found; in the range of theories about
judgment, proverbialism (again with the rarest aberrational exceptions) is
likewise an empty category.
In short, there are really not one but two partly overlapping scales of
"ideal types" for the judicial process. Only when the two scales are (as it
were) laid one upon another does the full five-item scale emerge; and only
then do "principles" become the central pivot on which the entire analysis
turns.

It is not for nothing that this notion has emerged as the central focus
for debates about common law judgment. The debate at the end of the
fifties surrounding Herbert Wechsler's criticism of the United States Supreme
Court,0 6 and the debate at the end of the sixties surrounding Ronald Dworkin's criticism of Herbert Hart's "model of rules",l1r both centred on an
attempt to give content to a notion of "principles" as an ideal basis for
judicial decision, which would hold in a perfect state of balance the conflicting needs of prescriptivism and of pragmatism, of continuity and change.
But our present analysis suggests that the search for "principles", if these are
conceived of as an identifiable kind of predetermined norms, is a misdirected
search. "Principial" judgment, as it emerges from the preceding discussion,
is not characterized by dependence on a distinctive normative content; it is
characterized rather by what it does with the normative content to be derived
from a body of "prescriptions", and yet also with the values (and "consequent" implementative strategies) derived from "pragmatic" judgments. In
short, "principial" judgment is characterized not by the materials it works with,
but rather by how it works. As M. P. Golding 08 perceptively noted over a
decade ago, our search for a perfectly balanced model of the judicial process

should be directed not to principles, but to principled decision-making.
106 See supra, notes 45, 75.
10 7 See supra, note 18.

10 8 Supra, note 75.

